The
people think what I think: False consensus and unelected elite
misperception of public opinion. Alexander C. Furnas, Timothy M.
LaPira. American J of Pol Sci, January 24 2024.
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12833
Abstract:
Political elites must know and rely faithfully on the public will to
be democratically responsive. Recent work on elite perceptions of
public opinion shows that reelection-motivated politicians
systematically misperceive the opinions of their constituents to be
more conservative than they are. We extend this work to a larger and
broader set of unelected political elites such as lobbyists, civil
servants, journalists, and the like, and report alternative empirical
findings. These unelected elites hold similarly inaccurate
perceptions about public opinion, though not in a single ideological
direction. We find this elite population exhibits egocentrism bias,
rather than partisan confirmation bias, as their perceptions about
others' opinions systematically correspond to their own policy
preferences. Thus, we document a remarkably consistent false
consensus effect among unelected political elites, which holds across
subsamples by party, occupation, professional relevance of party
affiliation, and trust in party-aligned information sources.
---
Our
tests of competing explanations for these misperceptions are robust
and consistent: Unelected political elites demonstrate a false
consensus effect in their estimates of public opinion. Simply, elites
believe that the policies they support are more popular among the
general public than they actually are, and that the policies they
oppose are less popular than they actually are. This relationship is
true regardless of the elite's party identification, professional
specialization, or information environment.